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Colin Wilson:  Good evening.  I'm Colin Wilson, and I'm the immediate past president of 
the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries [IFoA], and it's great to see two other past presidents 
of the Institute on tonight's panel.  It's my pleasure to welcome you to this witness 
seminar on the Fowler Inquiry into provision for retirement and the pension reforms of 
1986.  It forms part of a four-year project on the Thatcher government's pension reforms 
funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, and I'm grateful to the University of 
Bristol for organising tonight's event here at Staple Inn, the historic home of actuaries in the 
UK.  It's an honour to be joined tonight in addition to our members by invited guests and 
of course some of the key players of the time.  30 years have passed since the events we'll 
be examining this evening, yet the subject of pensions policy could not be more relevant 
today.  Indeed, the government will shortly be releasing a white paper addressing this 
issue, so I look forward to seeing you all here in 2047 for our witness seminar examining the 
new Bill and the decisions that fed into that.  As president, I've focused on the importance 
of thought leadership, and the contribution actuaries can make to the big issues affecting 
society today, such as the one we're discussing tonight, and as part of our commitment to 
developing thought leadership, the IFoA is dedicated to delivering high quality events such 
as this, to advancing actuary science, and to raising the profile of the profession.  Much of 
our work is about identifying and meeting the challenges of the future, and I strongly 
believe that dealing with these challenges is made easier and innovation is enhanced by 
sharing our ideas and working with others.  Collaboration is critical.  So it's been our 
pleasure to work with the University of Bristol and the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council on this seminar, and I'd particularly like to thank Professor Pemberton and the rest 
of the University of Bristol team for all their hard work in organising tonight's discussion.  
Finally, I'd just like to introduce tonight's chair, Gregg McClymont.  Gregg is currently the 
head of retirement savings at Aberdeen Asset Management.  He was Member of 
Parliament for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East from 2010 to 2015, and he served 
as Shadow Pensions Minister under Ed Miliband from 2011.  Before becoming an MP, he 
gained a PhD in modern British history, and was then Fellow in History at St Hugh's College, 
Oxford, so he's ideally placed to lead tonight's debate.  Over to you, Gregg.   
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Gregg McClymont:  Thank you very much, Colin.  Good evening and welcome to what I 
think promises to be a fascinating evening, something I've been looking forward to 
personally and greatly.  So without further ado, let me hand over to Professor Hugh 
Pemberton, who is the key person in the whole Thatcher pensions reform project, who's 
going to give a summary of the pre-circulated paper as it would have been sent out in your 
accompanying notes, and then we will go onto the panel.  So, over to Hugh.   
Hugh Pemberton:  Thanks, Gregg.  So thank you all very much for coming tonight.  My 
task in the next quarter of an hour is just briefly to describe the landmark reforms which 
reshaped our pensions system in 1986, and to map out the process that lead up to them.  
So until 1986 for most employees pension provision above the minimal basic state pension 
was through one of two routes.  Half the workforce was making contributions to an 
occupational scheme, the other half was in the state earnings related state pension 
scheme, or SERPS, the unfunded, pay-as-you-go state scheme that had been inaugurated in 
1978 by Barbara Castle, with the tacit support of the Conservative opposition.  Now, after 
three decades of hand wringing about the two nations in retirement that had been created 
by the growth of occupational pensions post-war, there had been a widespread sigh of 
relief in 1978 that a consensus had been forged around a partnership between employers 
and the state in providing earnings related pension top-ups to the BSP [basic state pension] 
for all employees. [Sorry, I realise I haven't done my clicking]. 
But that consensus that was forged was pretty brief.  Not least because of the Thatcher 
government's fears, which were clearly voiced by the then chancellor Geoffrey Howe to the 
National Association of Pension Funds [NAPF] in 1981 about the burden of pensions.  Not 
least the sustainability of public spending promises on SERPS in a world of lower economic 
growth, the cost of protecting both the BSP and contracted out guaranteed minimum 
pensions that were part of SERPS against relatively high inflation.  Then there was the 
danger of rebellion by those of working age against the burden placed on them as the ratio 
of productive workers to pensioners declined, which was eminently predictable, and the 
worries that the cost of occupational pensions might ultimately prove too heavy a burden 
for employers.  Finally, there were worries about the potentially distorting economic 
effects of large pension funds' lack of risk appetite.  
Now, those interlinked fears underpinned much rethinking about pensions in the
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ensuing five years, and in 1986, the Financial Services Act, in conjunction with that year's 
Social Security Act, a really major reform of the overall social security system piloted onto 
the statute book by Norman Fowler, set up a new system of mass personal pensions with 
the ability to contract out of SERPS, as occupational pensions could do.  It provided those 
taking out a personal pension with a financial incentive to do so, colloquially known in the 
industry as ‘the bribe’.  Now, in parallel, the '86 Social Security Act made very significant 
cuts to the future generosity of SERPS.  Large, long-term savings would be delivered 
through adjustments, including for example basing pension rights on average lifetime 
earnings, rather than on the best twenty years, and reducing the accrual rate.  
A new system of personal pensions and large, long-term cuts to SERPS were I think 
significant changes by any standard, but in fact, the government had planned to be 
considerably more ambitious than this.  In its green paper in 1985, it had proposed 
abolishing SERPS, moving its members into compulsory personal pensions with a minimum 
contribution of at least 4% of earnings, and with SERPS gone of course, occupational 
schemes would be compromised, because contracting out would disappear, and because 
younger members would almost certainly be tempted out of them into personal pensions.  
The green paper's proposals were opposed from virtually all quarters.  Not just from large 
employers, from trade unions and the so-called poverty lobby, which had been expected by 
the government, but from the actuary profession, and from insurers.  Firms that the 
government was relying on to make personal pensions work, which it had assumed would 
welcome compulsion, but which bluntly didn't see a profit in selling expensive to service 
personal pensions to millions of British workers on pretty low wages.  Consequently, the 
government fell back on a compromise solution.  Implement personal pensions as an 
addition to SERPS and occupational schemes, provide a financial incentive through the 
National Insurance system to people taking out a personal pension while implementing 
reforms to SERPS that would radically cut its long-term generosity, and it was assumed 
thereby create a further incentive for people to contract out into a personal pension.  
Now, the puzzle is that the government was taken aback by the strength of opposition that 
greeted the publication of its '85 green paper.  It's a puzzle because Norman Fowler had 
been careful to hold a public inquiry, the Inquiry into Provision for Retirement, to build 
support for reform.  The inquiry consisted of Mark Weinberg, founder and director of
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Hambro Life, the economist Alan Peacock, Marshall Field, with us tonight, then general 
manager and chief actuary of Phoenix Assurance, Stewart Lyon, general manager of Legal & 
General and president of the Institute of Actuaries, and Barney Hayhoe, a junior Treasury 
minister.  The inquiry's secretary was the DHSS civil servant Nick Montagu, who is also 
with us tonight.  Announced at the end of '83, the inquiry spent much of '84 taking 
evidence.  In the process, it revealed significant worries in the actuarial profession, and 
more generally, both about the idea of personal pensions, and the end of the partnership in 
pensions consensus.  So the principle concerns were that personal pensions would 
destabilise occupational pensions, that most individuals lacked the expertise to manage 
their retirement savings, certainly to directly invest those savings.  That defined 
contribution pensions would be unacceptably volatile and risky.  That personal pensions 
managed by large insurance companies would further institutionalise savings and 
investment, potentially reducing dynamism and entrepreneurialism in the economy, and 
anyway, there seemed to be little or no public demand for personal pensions.  
Now, shortly, our panel is going to explore amongst other things this disconnect between 
evidence given to the inquiry and the government's perception of political possibilities in 
the green paper.  But before that, I'd like briefly to explore the roots of the '85 green 
paper's proposals.  In July 1984, Nick Montagu, the Fowler Inquiry's secretary, wrote to 
the businessman, Nigel Vinson, to thank him for his input, and acknowledge his key role in 
shaping proposals on personal pensions that had just been set out in the Inquiry's 
consultative document.  That proposed that every employee had the right to take out a 
personal pension, but employers would no longer be able to force staff to join a company 
scheme.  That personal pensions would be able to contract out of SERPS, and that 
employers would have to contribute to them.  Nick described Nigel Vinson, and his 
colleague at the right-wing think tank, the Centre for Policy Studies, Philip Chappell, as the 
only begetters of the personal pension idea, which they'd set out in a 1983 pamphlet 
entitled Personal and Portable Pensions - For All. Now, essentially, Vinson and Chappell had 
used the technical problem of early leavers from occupational pension schemes, in which 
preserved rights were eroded by inflation, as a hook on which to hang a proposal to enable 
all employees to have their own self-invested, defined contribution personal pension into 
which they and their employer would contribute and which would follow them around from 
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job to job.  Most importantly, their proposal had a clear, ideological agenda that appealed 
to the Prime Minister.  The promotion of individual responsibility and the inculcation of 
capitalist virtues.  For Vinson and Chappell envisaged that those taking out a self-invested 
personal pension would gain a direct, unambiguous, and most importantly personal stake in 
British capitalism.  They would invest directly in British firms.  Welcome side effects 
would be that the power of pension funds and insurers, which the Centre for Policy Studies 
[CPS] saw as reservoirs of institutional power at odds with individual freedom, would be 
radically reduced.  At the same time, a handy target for socialist takeover would be 
removed, and investment would be allocated more efficiently, they argued, because it 
would be done by individuals, not institutions.  Consequently, Mrs Thatcher came to 
support the idea of an inquiry into how personal pensions might be implemented.  We 
should also, though, note her appointment of John Redwood as the head of her Policy Unit 
in January of '84.  Tasked by her with overseeing the adoption of personal pensions, he 
became a vocal advocate within government of making that change as part of a more 
radical reform that would see SERPS abolished, and its members moved into personal 
pensions compulsorily.  An advocate not least in MISC 111, a small ad-hoc cabinet sub-
committee that was set up to handle reform.  In September of '84, for example, Redwood 
warned Mrs Thatcher ‘when SERPS matures early in the next century, it will pose a major 
threat to the public finances of this country’.  'Its complicated calculations, linking 
pensions to earnings, is a classic example of the public sector trying to ape what the private 
sector should do and can do better, so SERPS has to go,' wrote Redwood.  
Redwood and his Policy Unit colleague David Willetts assured Mrs Thatcher that SERPS 
abolition would receive strong support from the ‘baying hoards’ of the pensions industry, 
advisers, intermediaries, investors, and others, because its replacement by personal 
pensions would result in ‘a bonanza of business opportunities’.  The Prime Minister 
ultimately agreed, despite having indicated in the '83 election campaign that there were no 
plans to make changes to SERPS.  In October of 1984, the government secretly committed 
itself to abolishing SERPS, even as the Fowler Inquiry continued to consider alternative 
options.  Abolition of course ran the risk of leaving many employees without pension rights 
other than the basic state pension, and thus creating a [future] public spending burden.  
To avoid that, it was decided to compel those without occupational cover to take out a 
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personal pension.  A rather paradoxical policy, given the underlying agenda of individual 
freedom, but one which would ensure the success of personal pensions, it was felt.  The 
Treasury, including Howe and Lawson's advisor, Adam Ridley, also with us tonight, had been 
generally quite sceptical about personal pensions and about the Redwood vision.  In April 
of '85, as the government geared up to issue its green paper, there was an almighty row 
when Nigel Lawson, who was later to describe SERPS as a long-term doomsday machine, 
woke up to just how much its abolition was going to cost the Treasury over the short to 
medium-term through tax relief on personal pension contributions.  That forced a 
compromise in the June green paper.  Abolition would be phased in over three years 
between '87 and '90, but not for those within fifteen years of retirement, though there 
weren't that many of those.  
Nevertheless, despite that compromise, the reaction to the green paper was explosive.  
For example, the head of the NAPF's parliamentary committee privately described the 
proposals as undesirable, unworkable, and destroying pension stability.  The NAPF flirted 
with the idea of refusing to cooperate with the government on the technical detail of 
implementation.  The CBI declared itself implacably opposed to SERPS abolition, and most 
employers’ organisations thought likewise.  A survey of firms found only 2% of them in 
favour of abolition of SERPS.  The TUC was also adamantly opposed, and strong doubts 
were also evident among actuaries, including the Association of Consulting Actuaries, the 
Institute of Actuaries, and the Faculty of Actuaries.  Insurers, not least Legal & General and 
Save & Prosper, who had supported personal pensions in evidence to the Fowler Inquiry 
were also highly unenthusiastic about compulsion.  That left Norman Fowler extremely 
exposed.  In October of 1985, he told MISC 111, the cabinet committee in which the 
radical reform had been forged, that ‘these reactions from bodies who would normally be 
firm supporters, and on whom we will depend heavily on getting new arrangements in 
place, lead me to think again about the path we've chosen.’  The Policy Unit complained 
to Mrs Thatcher that Fowler was ‘trying to escape’ from the deal on pensions that had been 
struck in MISC 111, but escape he did.  In the December white paper on reform of social 
security, abolition of SERPS had given way to reductions in its benefits.  Personal pensions 
would still be implemented, alongside SERPS and occupational schemes, and it would be 
possible for their members to take out a personal pension if they wished, but the success of 
personal pensions would now depend 
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on the attraction of the National Insurance ‘bribe’.  That failure to abolish SERPS and 
replace it with compulsory personal pensions represented a major blow to those who had 
pushed that strategy, most notably the Policy Unit and the CPS but, though SERPS 
remained, the '86 compromise effectively subjected it to death by slow strangulation, as 
Eric Short, former actuary, and then pensions correspondent at the Financial Times 
presciently noted, 'People retiring in the next century who relied on SERPS for their pension 
were going to be in for a shock.' Now, we'll be exploring that story in a future seminar on 
the legacy of these reforms, but tonight, we explore the Fowler Inquiry, and its relationship 
to the reforms of 1986.  So without more ado, I'm going to hand over to Gregg, to take us 
into that.  Thank you very much.   
Gregg McClymont:  Thank you very much, Hugh.  I think the scene is set for a fascinating 
discussion.  We will have an hour where our distinguished panel will try and tease out 
some of the complexities, the politics, the technical aspects and the context, really, I think, 
of trying to understand the genesis of the 1986 reform.  Then we will have half an hour for 
questions from our audience.  So let me just briefly introduce the panel before we move 
on to the discussion.  From right to left we have Nick Montagu, well known figure I think 
to many here tonight, Secretary to the 1983 Fowler Inquiry into Povision for Retirement, 
[and] eighteen years an official in the Department of Social Security and Health.  I don't 
think it changed its name in all those years, it changes its name very often these days. And I 
think [he] will give us the official view in some ways, the official's view of the genesis of the 
'86 Act.  We have Chris Deakin, government actuary for many years.  Before that, the 
directing actuary, I believe, and principal actuary in government, 35 years in total, Chris, 
inside the government's actuary department, will give us I think the actuarial view very 
clearly.  Sir Adam Ridley, who I would describe as giving us the political view, the view of 
the governing party during that period, and also I think to some degree the Treasury view, 
Adam having served as a director of the Conservative Research Department and then Nigel 
Lawson's special advisor between '79 and '84.  In my limited political experience, the 
political view and the Treasury view are often one and the same, so it might work well from 
that perspective.  Last, but certainly not least, Marshall Field I think will provide the 
industry perspective, having been himself a member of the 1983 Inquiry in his capacity as a 
Page 9 of 48 
senior figure in the life and pensions industry.  Sadly, Lord Fowler is unwell and can't be 
with us this evening, he sends his apologies, so we'll just have to crack on and have as 
interesting a discussion as we can, and I think it will be very interesting.  How I suggest we 
proceed, panel, is we start really with some opening observations, particularly around the 
issue of the 1980 decision to end the link between the state pension up-rating and average 
earnings as a way into the broader debate, and the pensions field.  So if I can ask you 
successively, I'll begin with Adam, put some context in the way in which government, 
industry, interested parties were thinking about the pensions policy space, in the context of 
the 1980 decision to remove that earnings link.  Adam?   
Adam Ridley:  Thank you very much, Gregg.  Let me just say there are quite easily the 
temptations to think of all of this as one integrated project.  There were in fact several 
separate streams of activity which coalesce and can be called a single project, but it's 
several different bits.  Let me start off then with what was going on in the earnings rule, 
links between earnings, prices, and pension levels.  This caused a lot of concern in private 
in the Conservative Research Department and elsewhere, and amongst our advisers by the 
time people had fully absorbed Barbara Castle's initiatives of the middle 70's, because by 
pushing the double linkage of any Social Security benefit to move upwards in line on a 
ratchet basis with whichever was higher of price increases and wage increases, you created 
an extremely challenging instrument, and in fact, in macro economic terms, a pathological 
one.  This was aggravated by the feeling that we had, post the oil crisis, and in the 
background the OECD and others very much wondering how the Western economies would 
recover.  We had a picture of flat growth, or in fact, often long run growth figures that 
were almost certainly lower than they had been, combined with rising expectations, and a 
great deal of difficulty in giving the less well-off a fair crack of the whip in these challenging 
circumstances with very sharp increases in nationalised energy prices, oil prices, and I know 
not what.  The Research Department analysis from '76 on, which I was largely responsible 
for, made us underline very quickly to the shadow cabinet, and particularly to the Treasury 
team, that there was no way in which it was sensible to stick with the wage link, and 
therefore we had to be prepared to stick to prices only, and that was agreed, and that you 
will find in the 1979 manifesto.  It caused some fuss, but people understood more or less, I 
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think.  Subsequently, there was a little bit of moaning internally when this came to be put 
into legislation, but it was not a major problem, and I think that people began to switch 
their focus, because by then, we were beginning to look at the long run problem of public 
expenditure growth in a much more systematic way, which I can revert to later.  Now, I'd 
just like to do a bit on the portal pensions bit now.   
Gregg McClymont:  Yes, if you can just say briefly about how you think the portability 
issue has been reported.   
Adam Ridley:  The portability issue is an interesting one because actually, it goes back a 
very long way.  Arguably it goes back to Beveridge and his concept of having some basic 
uniform benefits for one and for all, and then individual citizens improving on that in 
various ways as best they could.  Geoffrey Howe made an important contribution to the 
debate a long way back.  I haven't actually got the precise date here but I think it was 
1975.  He was a Bow Grouper, and he said it's extremely important to look at the danger 
of having too much automatic linkage, and he also started arguing the case for moving 
towards transferability and a bigger private sector role, and a more defined benefits role 
rather than defined contribution.  Then by 1976, by the time that the debate was growing-
,  
Gregg McClymont:  Can I just clarify there, Adam, when you say, 'More interested in 
defined benefits than defined contribution,' do we mean actually a move towards defined 
contribution?   
Adam Ridley:  I'm sorry, I mean defined contribution, yes, I just was getting my words 
mixed up.   
Gregg McClymont:  Of course.  It happens to us all regularly, especially me. 
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Adam Ridley:  It's an important subject to get right.  Anyway, in the middle 70's, there 
was quite a strong group of individuals in the Research Department, including particularly a 
colleague of mine called Peter Cropper, and to a lesser extent one or two others who were 
thinking extremely hard about a whole complex of issues, including portability, including 
how we straightened out other aspects of the pension system.  That then got picked up 
further in internal work after the '79 election.  My cousin, Nick Ridley, who was Financial 
Secretary [to the Treasury] at the time, he and I and a few others used to talk in the run up 
to '83 about something which we called a personal moneybox, or jokingly a ‘rat’, a ‘Ridley 
accumulating trust’.  Essentially, the proposition was that you put your money separately 
from any normal collective scheme, and that it might live under a trust structure, and you 
would have a measure of control over its use.  So that idea was already live and kicking.  
It was encouraged independently of that in the preparatory work for the '83 election, which 
involved a number of policy groups, and we talked very closely to the CPS at the time, 
whose work was often very much a matter of give and take between the internal ones and 
the external ones.   
Gregg McClymont:  Can I ask, Adam, at this stage, how far was that interest in portability? 
So is portability a proxy for a view of creating a closer linkage between the individual and 
the their retirement assets?   
Adam Ridley:  It was independent of that.  I can say a bit more about that in a moment, 
but it was an attraction, more important to some than others.  For many of us, it was just 
a way of making sure that individuals had proper control over the amount, and in broad 
terms, simply that they could influence the decision about the character of their 
investments, and choose their own risk.   
Gregg McClymont:  What was the perspective on the institutions who were currently 
undertaking that role -  insurance companies and defined benefit pension funds?   
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Adam Ridley:  I will be candid that institutions were viewed as conservative, slow moving, 
with notable exceptions, likely to oppose almost anything.  To be candid.  I mean, there's 
no point in disguising them, and there was a lot of evidence to support that.   
Gregg McClymont:  When you say likely to oppose almost anything, do you mean 
coercive?   
Adam Ridley:  They didn't want to change, I think is the word that I would use. 
Gregg McClymont:  Great, thank you. 
Adam Ridley:  Now, the Institute of Directors also piled into this game with an important 
reinforcement of the work that Vinson and Chappell were doing.  The timing of the '83 
election was such that we weren't able to fully absorb this debate, and frame something for 
the manifesto proper.  There were a string of unusual policy groups set up in opposition, 
and they just reported in time to get some of their ideas on the table for the '83 manifesto, 
but in this case not.   
Gregg McClymont:  So can I just stop you there, because we'll come onto '83.  Can I just 
stop you for a moment, thank you very much.  Marshall.   
Marshall Field:  Yes. 
Gregg McClymont:  You're part of the world's small ‘c’ conservatives, slow moving, you're 
not open to change.   
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Marshall Field:  That's not how I saw it. 
Gregg McClymont:  As a starting point, were you aware that that sort of view was gaining 
traction inside the Conservatives?   
Marshall Field:  Well, I take the point made a little while ago that there were several 
issues going on at the same time.  The principle issue that the pensions industry knew was 
that of the early leaver.  It was recognised that people who changed jobs were not being 
treated as well as they should be, but it was quite difficult to change that in that 
occupational pensions were always voluntary, and there was not much use in making it 
more expensive to have occupational pension schemes when those who didn't have 
anything at all were let off scot-free.  There was a real fear that improving the benefit of 
the early leaver at the expense of the old employee would cause employers to give up 
pension schemes altogether, and that was a major fear.  There was another background in 
that following the Boyd Carpenter scheme of '59, there was tinkering with pensions going 
on, and we had a decade of different schemes coming up, from Dick Crossman's, to Keith 
Joseph, to Barbara Castle.  We'd had ten years of great discussions which led eventually to 
the Barbara Castle scheme, but during that ten-year period, employers were reluctant to do 
anything at all because they wanted to know what the background was going to be.  So 
when we got round to '83, there was great support for doing something about the early 
leaver, and Norman Fowler was invited to the National Association of Pension Funds 
conference in the summer of '83, and he made the closing address, and he spoke to it.  I 
wasn't there, but he came back fired with the need to do something for the early leaver, 
and he had a one-day conference in September of '83, and I went then as Chairman of the 
Life Offices trade association.  Numbers of people spoke to it, and as a result of that, he 
set up, or there was set up the inquiry into pension provision.  I was on that as well, but 
not representing any institution at all, I was there privately.  We had a number of 
meetings, papers were submitted by fourteen bodies at public meetings, but that was 
wholly in the context of helping the early leaver.  There was no question at that time of 
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reducing SERPS or making investment changes of any kind.  It was wholly in the context of 
the early leaver, and I do remember the comment that we made in the Life Offices about 
the Centre for Policy Studies report, which was amongst those papers - an interesting 
comment, but totally irrelevant to the point under discussion, and that was our starting 
point.   
Gregg McClymont:  Was this the Chappell and Vinson paper? 
Marshall Field:  Yes, it was.  Well, it was a paper produced by them.  Whether it was 
the same paper, I don't know.   
Gregg McClymont:  Yes. 
Marshall Field:  That personal pension sub-group reported in July.  No, no, earlier than 
that.  July '84, and I don't think there was much in the way of consultation with other 
bodies after that.  I was still on the inquiry and there was a great deal of discussion on the 
inquiry about SERPS and the index linking, and portability and all the rest of it.  But to 
express surprise that the industry didn't take the opportunity that they had expressed 
earlier in personal pensions is not entirely fair, because this aspect of it was never brought 
to them.   
Gregg McClymont:  So the industry was focused on and trying to find a solution to the 
early leaver problem?   
Marshall Field:  At that time, yes. 
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Gregg McClymont:  How far was the industry aware that there were very powerful forces 
within the government who wanted to do something?   
Marshall Field:  Well, they'd read the Centre of Policy Studies report, but that was about 
it, I think, from my view.  Others here were around at the time dealing with pensions as 
well.   
Gregg McClymont:  So industry wasn't feeling that there was something imminent which 
was going to be very …  
Marshall Field:  No, it came up later on, and Alan Peacock was very keen to abolish SERPS. 
I remember talking quite a bit about that then, but this was all of a bit of a surprise from 
where it had started originally.  I remember commenting at the time that the Fowler 
Inquiry had changed its terms of reference twice during its sittings.   
Gregg McClymont:  We'll come back to the final inquiry in detail, because clearly that's a 
central element.  So, so far, we're building up a picture of … inside the government there 
are influential individuals and institutions, whether in the Treasury or in the Conservative 
Research Department and in the Policy Unit who are looking at something much more 
radical, to abolish SERPS.  The industry is focused on the early leaver problem, and isn't so 
much aware of this thrust which has really been in play for a decade or so, from a …  
Marshall Field:  It all came much more to a head with the issue of the green papers, but 
that was in '85.   
Gregg McClymont:  The green papers.  That's really useful, we'll come to that.  Can I 
come to the other side of the table, and ask …, I think I'll go to Chris first, and then Nick, you 
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can give a considered departmental view.  Chris, the Government Actuary’s Department, 
the indexation decision, was that something which had been much thought of, the 
implications of it?   
Chris Deakin:  Well, I can't really vouch for that in the sense that I wasn't at the 
Government Actuary’s Department in 1980, I was at the Treasury.   
Gregg McClymont:  Even better.  That's where the decision was made. 
Chris Deakin:  I was responsible for the health service, not for the Social Security system, 
but I was involved in the creation of SERPS back in the mid- '70s, and that was very much 
designed by people at GAD, and then around 1975 when we had the Social Security 
Pensions Act, I was engaged in determining how we should deal with the rebate, the 
contracted out rebate.  How much you should pay people to stay out of SERPS, but I think 
at that time, 1973, Better Pensions from Barbara Castle was based on some projections, 
which the Government Actuary obviously was involved in.  The [Better Pensions] paper 
only presented projections going forward about 30 years from the mid-'7 0s.  So only 
going up just into the turn of the millennium, and it assumed on government instructions, 
3% real earnings growth, which then subsequently became considered to be much too 
aggressive.  So when the Thatcher government came in, in 1979, there were already 
concerns within the Treasury I think about the longer term cost of SERPS, although it had 
been cross-party consensus in the mid-'70s. And so the Treasury were very concerned 
about the way in which the ratchet was operating, because the Labour government had 
introduced the higher of prices or earnings as the revaluation of the basic pension, which is 
fine so long as they, sort of, stay in the same order, but if they keep overtaking each other 
you then get a sort of double whammy in terms of the extent to which the basic pension is 
increased.  So that decision to put the basic pension on a prices revaluation basis, which 
was still deemed to be consistent with the manifesto promise to maintain the value of the 
pension, was pretty quickly taken, but wasn't at that stage, I think, really attached to an 
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idea of doing anything much to SERPS, which began to develop later, the way I saw it.  
Because I came really back into this field at the beginning of 1985 when I was Deputy 
Government Actuary with responsibility for Social Security and pensions policy, and one of 
the first things we were looking at were the very long-term costs of SERPS, and this 
proposal, which was, sort of, coming out from the Number 10 Policy Unit, to abolish SERPS 
altogether.  The Treasury were sold on that initially, and the MISC 111 decision suggests 
the Treasury bought into it, but very soon I think Treasury and Nigel Lawson, who was the 
Chancellor then, became very concerned about the transitional costs, and although the 
Government Actuary’s Department is supposed to be neutral and was advising both the 
Department for Work and Pensions and the Treasury, as this process went forward, Nigel 
Lawson said, 'Look here, Government Actuary’s Department , I want you here in the 
Treasury, not advising those people over there'.   
Gregg McClymont:  Sounds very familiar. 
Chris Deakin:  So throughout the period leading up to the white paper and the Bill in early 
1986, I was actually sitting most of the time in the Treasury, so that I was accessible to Mr 
Lawson whenever he needed advice.  So I see this as being driven by a, sort of, conflict 
between a, if you like, a sort of philosophical view that we should move from having so 
much public provision towards having more private provision.  Private provision should be 
personal because of these reasons that Adam's already mentioned, [it] wouldn't be so 
corporatist to have individual pensions rather than having occupational pensions which 
were driven by the big investment houses, and so on.  I think there was influence also 
because of what was going on elsewhere in the world.  1981, Chile introduced a solely 
individual account system and completely threw away its traditional social security.  The 
Chicago School of economists was really, sort of, pushing this idea of personal identification 
with wealth, and how that was, sort of, important in terms of the country's growth to have 
people identifying with their own wealth, rather than being part of an insurance company 
or pension fund contractual arrangement.  That then came together to lead to the initial 
proposal to get rid of SERPS, and then the kickback from that, because it was so costly to do 
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it, in terms of the transition, and also the opposition from the industry because they were 
not that enthused about the idea of having to offer personal pensions to all these small low-
level earnings people who moved jobs, and so on.  They preferred to concentrate on 
selling personal pensions to high net worth individuals.  That was where they made their 
money.  If you once went for a compulsory system where they had to provide them to 
everybody, it would be extremely administratively complicated, and potentially costly.  
The profit margins would be very low, and therefore there was not the interest from the 
insurance industry and the pensions industry were of course fighting for their life for the 
continuation of the occupational pension schemes, which they saw being undermined by 
the proposal for personal pensions.   
Gregg McClymont:  Absolutely fascinating.  There's a number of things I want to come 
back to there.  Chile I'm very interested in, and the potential influence or not that that 
might have had, and of course, the industry view is of course [inaudible] around how far the 
industry can serve the well-paid.  I want to come now to Nick.  Nick, your reflections on 
anything you've heard so far, and where you think we should be starting from?   
Nick Montagu:  Well, I think we're probably starting from the right sort of position.  I 
confess to being less old in sin than any of my three colleagues because I was actually 
parachuted in to be Secretary of the pensions inquiry in 1983, not having worked in 
pensions in the DHSS before.  Indeed, in 1973, I was still enjoying the pristine purity of an 
academic philosopher's existence, and in 1980, doing a erroneous scrutiny on the arcane 
world of National Insurance contributions.  So coming in, I came in and I think the context 
is very much as the others have described it.  There were essentially the two strands.  
Apart from the political worries about the cost of pensions, and the worsening support 
ratio, there had been a couple of pieces of what one might call routine work by officials in 
the DHSS, known by characteristically dreadful civil service acronyms as QWERP and 
BOPWIG, and QWERP chaired by the official responsible for state pensions essentially laid 
the ground for the official view, obviously with Government Actuary involvement, of just 
how difficult things were likely to get with the state earnings related pension scheme, and 
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the worsening support ratio.  This was reflected as Chris will no doubt want to say when 
we come actually to talk about Norman's inquiry and the papers submitted to it, in the 
background note, which Edward Johnson the then Government Actuary, who was actually a 
member of the inquiry, produced very early on to the inquiry.  The other strand, again, as 
Adam particularly has mentioned, was what one might call the high-Tory ‘every man his 
own capitalist’ background to the kind of thing that Nigel Vinson and Philip Chappell were 
writing about, and this conveniently linked up with what was widely seen, although 
Marshall's explained the commercial background, the position of the early leaver was 
widely seen as something of a scandal.  That people leaving a pension scheme were seen 
as unacceptably disadvantaged without any rights so far as transfer values were concerned, 
and again, when we come onto the inquiry, we can talk about how the right to a transfer 
value emerged very early on as a major theme in Norman's thinking.  I think it's important 
to pick up on just two more points that have come up.  First, I hope Hugh will forgive me 
for correcting him in saying that Mark Weinberg was not a member of the pensions inquiry 
initially, and that is actually quite significant.  As the inquiry progressed, Norman set up a 
separate sub-group on personal pensions, and Mark was a member of that.  He 
subsequently became a member of the full inquiry, and extrmeely influential.  We'll come 
on to that.  The other point to mention, again, a sort of foreshadowing point, picks up on 
what Chris said about overseas experience.  I went with Norman to the United States very 
early in 1984, so it was still in the early days of the inquiry, and he was extremely impressed 
by what he saw there.  In a way, this links up with what one might call Vinson Chappell 
ideology, but I think it did lead him to become determined to achieve what he saw as a kind 
of cultural shift to bring about the kind of interest in individual retirement savings that we 
saw in the States.  I think, Gregg, I'll leave it at that for the moment.   
Gregg McClymont:  Absolutely fascinating.  Of course, our view about everyone a 
capitalist is very different from John Maynard Keynes'.  Keynes' view about the US stock 
market is not to be followed because every man is in it, and doesn't know what they're 
doing. I think actually at this stage, I want to ask about Chile in that international context, 
but I think this leads us very nicely into 1983, and the inquiry.  Because what I'm picking up 
already is you have the 1983 creation of that inquiry, you have the separate sub-group 
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which Marshall mentioned already on personal pensions, which to an outsider might seem 
to be doing the same things, and then we have this huge serious presentation by the end of 
'84, the government coming to a view anyway about pre-judging, I suppose, the inquiry 
around the abolition of SERPS in that context.  So can we just crack straight into the '83 
inquiry?  With my former politician's hat on, often government sets up these kinds of 
enquiries either because it wants cover for doing something, or because it wants to kick it 
into the long grass.  That doesn't seem to be the case, certainly the latter, as far as I can 
see, but I'll have to be corrected in this context.  The membership, who made the 
decisions, Nick, about the membership of this?  
Nick Montagu:  Norman made the decisions.  Again, a lot had been pre-discussed before 
I was appointed Secretary, but I think in discussion with the key officials at the top of the 
DHSS, and the key people there were the first permanent secretary, Ken Stowe, more so 
actually than Geoffrey Otton, who was the second permanent secretary in charge of Social 
Security, but Norman looked more to Ken, and also the guy I was working to was a guy 
called Strachan Heppell, who was the deputy secretary in the old jargon for Social Security 
policy.  And I think that probably having consulted around the profession, and thought 
about the kind of representation that was needed to make the inquiry respectable in the 
literal sense of the word, Marshall and Stewart Lyon were heavyweight leaders of the 
profession.  Marshall, although he said he was on it in a personal capacity, was head of the 
Life Offices Association, Stewart as president of this Institute, and Alan Peacock as a 
prominent right-wing economist.  What was lacking was, it became apparent that it was 
lacking, and forgive me if I seem to be making a value judgement, of course, as a former 
official I couldn't possibly do that, was a pensions salesman red in tooth and claw.  Who 
better than Mark Weinberg, who had set up Hambro Life to understand the marketing and 
the dynamics of the market, and that was why when I think Norman realised, if you like, 
that there were two strands to the inquiry, one, the continuing state pension debate, and 
the other which he saw as needing a very particular push, which was the personal pensions 
agenda.  That was why he set up the sub-group within the inquiry and conscripted Mark 
onto that.  The sub-group reported formally to the main inquiry, but I think Marshall will 
agree that it was quite largely a formality, that.  It acquired very much a life and a dynamic 
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of its own, and indeed, Mark acquired a very strong personal relationship with and 
influence on Norman as secretary of state.   
Gregg McClymont:  So Mark Weinberg was in that context of the sub-group, was basically 
somebody who understood what would go on on the ground, and to come up with 
something practical that would work.   
Nick Montagu:  Yes, yes. 
Gregg McClymont:  With the condescension of posterity, when I look at the makeup of it, 
what's missing is anyone representing pension funds, or the occupational space in a 
broader sense.  Is that fair?  Or is that inaccurate, Marshall?   
Marshall Field:  I've no idea what the Occupational Pensions Board and the National 
Association for Pension Funds was doing at that time.  This is after the green papers had 
happened, but I was interested in the comment made a little while ago that government 
was surprised that eminent insurers such as Legal & General, and Save & Prosper turned 
away from the idea.  Now, Legal & General is a very fine company and still exists, and is 
doing a great job, but it is not a company that is in touch with the millions of people dealing 
with small products.  The companies to have asked were the Prudential and the Pearl, and 
the Friendly societies.  Presumably the government didn't ask them, but they were in 
touch with the small business, and knew that it couldn't be done effectively.   
Gregg McClymont:  Very interesting, and that's clearly very important. 
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Marshall Field:  A personal pension makes sense if it's plausible.  One man carrying a 
pension through successive employments makes sense.  One man being in a job for three 
months and then moving somewhere else with a tiddly bit of pension does not make sense. 
Gregg McClymont:  Of course.  1983, and we'll come on, again, further on to the green 
paper, the 1983 inquiry had a political slash to it, so there's a Treasury minister on the …  
Adam Ridley:  Barney Hayhoe. 
Gregg McClymont:  Yes, Barney Hayhoe.  I remember as a child thinking that was a very 
funny name.   
Adam Ridley:  It is. 
Gregg McClymont:  That tells you what a sad childhood I had that I actually knew who 
Barney Hayhoe was.  Treasury view of this inquiry/your view, and remembering the 
genesis of the 1983 inquiry and its proceedings, your sense of its importance?   
Adam Ridley:  Can I say there were two things immediately preceeding the creation of the 
enquiries.  The first thing is many who were alive at the time or at least following public 
affairs will recall 1982 saw a rather scandalous leak from teh Central Policy Review staff of a 
study of long-term public spending.  Now, this really did flutter.  It caused a great deal of 
anxiety and what it did was to show for the first time that you had to plan expenditure over 
much, much longer time periods, not just in the areas of pension and Social Security, but 
much else.  If you lowered your expectations of growth, you had to be much more modest 
in what you took out, whatever it might be [inaudible] secondary choices.  In the 
aftermath of that, there was then quite a major internal strategic debate informally, which 
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culminated in 1983 after the election in the use of one of the newly introduced strategic 
economic Cabinets that I think took place in the summer of '83.  The essence of that was 
the Treasury saying, 'Look here, this expenditure problem, which has been coming up time, 
and time, and time again, and links in with a lot of the other things,' for example, what Chris 
was saying about the long-term analysis that he’d been involved with, 'We've got to do 
something.  We must make maintaining our tax cutting policy the highest priority, and 
subordinate expenditure to that for the time being.' In the light of that, you then did an 
analysis of the composition of public spending, and you saw the enormous role of Social 
Security, and then within that, the large and growing role of pensions.  So it's pretty clear 
where you went, and therefore that led to a kind of presumptive debate that you had to be 
prepared to hit at SERPS.  Then of course we have all sorts of different degrees of taste 
being expressed as to what you do, but it's crucial to recognise that that was the 
framework.  Now, Norman, who had been I think two years already Social Security 
secretary was well aware of the importance of the argument, and the analysis, and he did 
what I think is admirable for a minister, which is to really constitute some serious groups 
with expertise, and give them what seemed to us to be an admirable degree of latitude.  
Not very common, unheard of today, one may say.  Perhaps a 20th century practice which 
we've forgotten about.  So it was much welcomed.   
Marshall Field:  I'd like to come in on that one, actually, because I had a great respect for 
Norman Fowler.  He was the one person in government at that level who really 
understood what was being said to him.  Took the trouble to work it all out, get it clear in 
his own mind.  He really knew about it.   
Gregg McClymont:  Very unusual in any period, I imagine. 
Marshall Field:  Indeed. 
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Gregg McClymont:  Of course, it's worth noting I've observed that to spend that number 
of years in a department is so unusual now that actually even two years counts.  I know 
that would make you a veteran now, '81 to '83, never mind the fact that he went on for 
another four years.   
Marshall Field:  One other interesting aspect of those early discussions, bearing on the 
Treasury, Barney Hayhoe said right at the beginning that, 'I must forbid all discussions of 
anything to do with tax.  If you ever get on to tax, I will halt the discussion immediately,' 
and he did, several times.  There were occasions when Edward, and Stewart and I talked 
about tax for quite a long time, and Norman was lapping it up, and then Barney Hayhoe 
recognised what was going on, and said, 'I must stop it here.  You're talking about tax, I 
think.' But it is not a good idea to discuss the pensions regime without discussing the tax 
implications.   
Gregg McClymont:  Of course. 
Marshall Field:  But we were forbidden to do that. 
Gregg McClymont:  Can I ask the panel at this stage, would it be right, and this is obviously 
an oversimplification, but you had two driving forces in the genesis of the 1983 inquiry.  
You had the fiscal dimension, and the desire to control public expenditure, and you had the 
ideological dimension - portability, individual greater connection to their pension assets.  
Is that a fair way to describe the genesis of the '83 inquiry?  That those two forces are 
working together to encourage the department and the government to look seriously at 
these issues?   
Adam Ridley:  It was broader than that.  That’s certainly correct as far as it goes, but if 
you look at the four enquiries, and what they were supposed to deal with, and what the did 
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deal with, it was picking up a very large number of Social Security issues, and there was 
associated subterranean work going on elsewhere feeding in or coming out from it.   
Nick Montagu:  I think that's right.  Thoug there's the time element.  Adam is right on 
the way things turned out.  Initially, it was just the pensions inquiry.  I suspect that 
Norman may have had, in the back of his mind, the need to look at the other three big areas 
- supplementary benefit, housing benefit and children, essentially.  But to some extent,
the inquiry, the pensions inquiry was an experiment, and it had that feel about it from the 
start.  Seeing it from the secretariat point of view, I was very conscious that we needed to 
make it work, and from talking to Norman, and I agree with Marshall's description of him, 
that it needed to be a bit showy and something new.  It needed to be very public, in one 
sense very transparent. And the idea of a government inquiry of that particular sort, taking 
evidence in public, a bit like a select committee, was something pretty new, and something 
that we invented and, frankly, kept our fingers crossed that the model worked.  Then as 
Adam says, it broadened out into the wider review of Social Security, because Norman felt 
that that model had worked, and so he then set up the other three enquiries essentially on 
the same model.   
Gregg McClymont:  Was that decision to widen it made before all the politics kicked in 
around the backlash, if you want to call it that, to the government's proposals?   
Nick Montagu:  Oh, yes, because again, I forget the exact timing, i would have said that 
the other three, Adam probably remembers, followed in, what, spring of 1984?  All four 
enquiries were busy working and taking evidence separately, and the results of the four 
enquiries were brought together in the green paper, and then the subsequent white paper, 
and of course the Social Security Act.   
Gregg McClymont:  I think it's very important, Adam's raised it and it's been brought out 
by other panellists, that of course pensions always exist within a spectrum of other political 
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issues.  How much attention was the government giving to pensions per se, and probably 
just as importantly related, was pensions a big public issue?  A bit public political issue in 
this period?   
Adam Ridley:  Certainly in my experience, in areas where they mattered, people got very 
worried.  Pensions were very much a nervy subject, if you'll excuse my saying, and people 
were very myopic about it, and idiotically so, but where it became something that's 
impinged on them, they got worried, so early leavers, or the provisions for widows, or 
whatever it might be would suddenly surge up like a volcano in a very deep ocean.   
Gregg McClymont:  Sorry to interrupt, can I ask you the politics of early leavers? 
Crudely, who did these people tend to vote for?   
Adam Ridley:  Well, probably, I mean, they would have been professional, more 
professional-ish or energetic executives, whether in public or private activities, and that's 
why I suspect there would have been slightly fewer Labour voters, but I couldn't be …, I 
didn't have a view about the politics of them.   
Gregg McClymont:  Do you think other people had a view about the politics of it?  Were 
these ‘our people’, to use Mrs Thatcher's phrase?   
Adam Ridley:  No, I don't think-, I mean, I think she thought it was wanted by 'our people', 
but I don't think that she thought it was uniquely going to benefit them.  I think she saw it 
as something that would have a very wide impact.   
Marshall Field:  I think we were very pleased to have come through the '70s where 
pensions were thrown around by the various governments which came into power at that 
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time, and we wanted a bit of relative peace.  Before that, the Institute of Actuaries and 
the Faculty of Actuaries had issued a paper called 'An Appeal to Statesmanship, let us 
discuss pensions out of politics', it's a very good paper.   
Gregg McClymont:  It sounds very relevant. 
Marshall Field:  I'm not sure when that was.  It was probably the late '60s. 
Adam Ridley:  Because I had this one other thing about the way in which the pressures 
were building up to widen the agenda.  If you talk to Norman, he will repeat what I 
remember at the time, which was actually ministers generally were very worried about 
children and child welfare, and there was a long, long history of discussion about Child 
Benefit and what was and wasn't working.  And there was a growing awareness that you 
had to do more about the people who were falling through the holes in the safety net, and 
don't forget it was after several years of high and rising unemployment, so this was 
perfectly proper and admirable.  So I think all of that was creating extra pressure for the 
widening of the agenda.   
Nick Montagu:  I think that's right.  The other thing which again Adam will remember 
was rightly worrying the Treasury, was the whole situation with supplementary benefit.  In 
particular, the so-called single payments in supplementary benefit which were demand-led, 
had spiralled hopelessly out of control.   
Gregg McClymont:  Can you explain what are they or what were they? 
Nick Montagu:  Yes, basically, supplementary benefit had two elements to it.  There was 
the underlying supplementary benefit, the rate of benefit that you got if you satisfied the 
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relevant income test, but then there were single payments, which were based on need.  If 
you were on a supplementary benefit, and you could show that your oven was broken, you 
could get a payment, a special payment called a single payment, to replace the oven.  If a 
member of the household was incontinent, you could get a single payment for whatever 
was needed there.  When single payments were introduced, I'm not sure when that was, I 
never worked in supplementary benefit, I don't have a detailed knowledge of it, they were 
fairly modest.  By the time we went down to Wilton Park, which we may talk about 
perhaps, to frame the green paper, therefore in 1985, they totalled I think from memory 
£380m a year, and that was an awful lot of money.  It was proverbial in the old DHSS that 
you wouldn't believe how many incontinent gardeners, because you could get gardening 
implements too, there were on the eighth floor of Glasgow tenements.   
Gregg McClymont:  No comment.  So the debate around the cost of the pension budget 
gets collapsed into that broader debate about the cost of Social Security?   
Nick Montagu:  Of course, it's also important I think for the purposes of our, if you like, 
longer discussion tonight to bear in mind that supplementary benefit is relevant to 
pensions.  There's always the background worry, not least in the mind of the Treasury, 
that if you give people too many freedoms and they misuse them, are they going to end up 
on supplementary pension coming out not of the National Insurance fund, but out of the 
consolidated fund, and again, Adam will remember that well as a continuing worry.   
Gregg McClymont:  That sounds very contemporary in the context of the pension 
freedoms.   
Nick Montagu:  Isn't it?  Isn't it just? 
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Gregg McClymont:  Chris, and this is maybe an unfair question, perhaps you can't answer 
it.  The Government Actuary's view of the cost of pensions in let's say '79 to '85, how much 
clear water, if any, would there be between the political view of the priorities of the 
government and an actuarial view of how sustainable pensions costs were in the SERPS?   
Chris Deakin:  Well, I think probably the Government Actuary was always fairly careful not 
to give a view on whether it was sustainable or not.   
Gregg McClymont:  Very wise. 
Chris Deakin:  The view of the Government Actuary’s Department would be a projection 
of the cost on the basis of the benefits which had been promised on certain economic and 
demographic assumptions, and demographic assumptions were very much the prerogative 
of the Government Actuary’s Department .  The economic assumptions were always 
discussed with the Treasury because they were, if you like, there was an underlying belief 
that the Treasury would know better what the real earnings growth and so on was going to 
be in the future, or at least they wanted their assumptions to be used.  So two things that 
had changed since the Barbara Castle era.  One that it was no longer thought reasonable 
to allow for anything like that degree of growth in the economy that had been projected 
there, and the other thing was that the projections were now routinely made over 50, 60 
years into the future, and there was a huge demographic shift expected in about the 2020s, 
2030s, 2040s, and it would peak around 2030, 2035.  Which hadn't been part of the 
projections that had been made in the mid '70s, but now very evidently came up, so all the 
projections that we were publishing in the 1980s showed this massive growth, and the cost 
of SERPS, which started off of course quite small, because it was only just beginning to 
accrue, by the 2020s, 2030s was going to be much more than the basic pension.  So you 
could see how it was going to come to dominate the future cost, and that's why a little bit, 
sort of, later on from when Nick was talking there, we started thinking about how could we 
modify SERPS so as not to be too controversial from a political point of view, but to really 
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reduce the cost.  One of the things we did which substantially reduced the cost was to 
remove the best twenty year rule, which dramatically brought down the long-term cost, 
and didn't sound like doing anything, and we also changed the accrual rate from 20% to 
25% over a career, and removed the widow's benefit of 100% of the spouse down to 50%.  
A combination of those halved the cost of SERPS in the long-term, so that was immediately 
really attractive to the Treasury, who saw here a way forward in terms of a structure that 
could be sold politically.  A prudent thing to do, to reduce these ridiculously high, long-
term costs of SERPS, but not as risky as going down the route of getting rid of SERPS 
altogether.   
Gregg McClymont:  Yes, so the Treasury have a 50% reduction in the long-term cost, and 
also avoid the issues around tax relief costs accruing from compulsory personal pensions.  
That takes us nicely into the backlash, if one wants to call it that, after the political 
machinations and the government proposal to move to the abolition of SERPS and 
compulsory personal pensions.  I mentioned it a wee while ago, and I want to just ask it 
again to see if anyone on the panel has got a view.  When I look at the makeup of the '83 
inquiry, the absence of any pension fund, sort of, representation really strikes me.  Is that 
just in hindsight, or would that have been seen at the time, that the NAPF, there's no 
employers represented on the inquiry.  Which given its provision for retirement seems 
quite unusual.  Does anyone have a view on that on the panel?  If not, we can pick it up. 
Nick Montagu:  No, I don't remember any suggestion.  Obviously we consulted the 
employers, who consulted the NAPF [National Association of Pension Funds].  I don't 
remember anybody commenting that we really needed a representative of employers or 
pension funds.   
Marshall Field:  To that extent, the Life Offices weren't represented, either. 
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Gregg McClymont:  I think what's striking is if you think of the Turner Commission, it was 
very much built around, 'We need to think about the employer view,' so I just put that out 
there.  Now, moving on, because no surprise …  
Marshall Field:  The TUC and the CBI and people all gave evidence to the sub-group. 
Adam Ridley:  They did indeed. 
Gregg McClymont:  Yes, they were evidence givers.  So if we jump forward, because as I 
suspected, time is getting ahead of us.  In the context where the proposal emerges, and 
then the industry reacts unfavourably to the suggested way of proceeding from the 
government, Marshall, could you give us some context on that?  So you said at the 
beginning that you were focused, the industry and the Life Offices were focused, on the 
early leaver, and then it turns out that the government is very keen on doing something 
much more radical, and having personal pensions for all sections of society.  Was the Life 
Offices' view and criticism of that approach based on that anxiety about having to service 
an uneconomic part of the market?   
Marshall Field:  I think the Life Offices and the industry was quite happy to contemplate 
personal pensions and portable policies for those that couldn't reach themselves, but to 
make it a compulsory arrangement, and in the terms that it came up, was not a good idea. 
When it went on, of course, we …. Are you going to come to the personal pension crisis, and 
the overselling crisis, or is that next? 
Gregg McClymont:  Well, I think that's the subject of the next seminar. 
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Marshall Field:  Of course, that was considered in the Fowler Inquiry, and was mentioned 
in the papers.  'There is a problem, a risk of overselling, and that will be looked after by 
the Financial Services Act which is currently going through parliament'.   
Nick Montagu:  That is an absolutely critical point, because going beyond the actual 
inquiry, if you forgive a bit of a personal thing because it's relevant, I was promoted from 
the inquiry to be the undersecretary in charge both of pensions and also of the whole Bill 
resulting from the review of Social Security.  As such, I was very heavily involved in the 
discussions on consumer protection from overselling, from mis-selling, and we were 
categorically assured that the regulations to be made under what became the Financial 
Services Act would provide completely adequate protection to consumers.  Maybe, and 
hindsight is a wonderful thing, maybe I should reproach myself with being over-credulous, 
but Marshall and I were chatting informally beforehand, and in fact, with that hindsight, the 
regulation and the safeguards against mis-selling should have rested firmly with the DHSS 
and the Occupational Pensions Board, and it might have been a very different story.   
Chris Deakin:  Can I just add on that, that the thing that really turned it was the decision 
by Norman Fowler to push for the employers not to be allowed to force people to remain 
members of their pension scheme, and I was deputy Government Actuary advising at that 
time, and very strongly said, 'Well, this is going to be a disaster.  This is going to lead to 
huge mis-selling,' and then we have the other story which Marshall was alluding to, and 
compensation and mis-selling.   
Nick Montagu:  The scale was extraordinary.  I mean, you can argue the pros and cons of 
the extra contracted out rebate over and above what was justified actuarially, but quite 
literally on the closing day for opting out and benefiting from the extra rebate, the entrance 
to the DHSS Newcastle Central Office was blocked by lorries with application forms, and 
that is quite literally true.   
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Gregg McClymont:  I guess behavioural economics now would tell us not to be surprised 
by that sort of outcome.  Adam, we're fast running out of time, which as I say doesn't 
surprise me because it's so fascinating we could go on forever.  I want to put you in the 
Treasury bucket for a moment.  In the end, did the Treasury get what it wanted out of it? 
I know you departed from being a SPAD [special political advisor] in '84, but did the 
Treasury get what it wanted out of the 1986 Act?  There wasn't compulsion.  It didn't 
have the issue of the extra tax relief accruing and personal pensions became an option 
rather than compulsory.   
Adam Ridley:  I mean, I think whether you talk to Nigel Lawson or to others involved, they 
would say having regard to all the ups and downs in lives it was not a bad compromise.  
There was a particular threat that was a nightmare, and that is well-described in Nigel 
Lawson's memoirs when it turned out no one had done their arithmetic on what the PSBR 
[public sector borrowing requirement] costs were doing, the full abolition of SERPS, and 
that would have been a catastrophe.  Probably it would have been I think a community 
charge type mistake as well.   
Gregg McClymont:  Can you just expand on that a bit? 
Adam Ridley:  Well, there was an earlier move, not only pushed by the Treasury, to 
consider the total abolition of SERPS in a very short time.  If you did that, you had to 
postulate that something would happen to pick up the demands and the pressures 
somewhere else, and that would be a PSBR cost.  That had not been calculated, for very 
curious reasons that I don't understand.  See Lawson's description of this.  So once that 
was safeguarded by a compromise in which you had some continuation of SERPS, and there 
was a certain amount of extra PSBR cost involved in the measures that were taken to 
develop the new system, that was pretty reasonable.  The interesting thing is that it then 
did not become-, it no longer was a high profile political issue such as it had been.  Very 
quickly everybody went to sleep.   
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Nick Montagu:  It had diffused it.  The fundamental problem, and it's grandmothers and 
eggs talking to this particular audience, with moving from a pay-as-you-go scheme to a 
funded scheme is what in shorthand we simply called 'The funding gap'.  That today's 
employers and employees would need simultaneously to be putting the money to fund the 
future pensions of the employees while paying out to fund on a pay-as-you-go basis today's 
pensioners, and that's not soluble.   
Gregg McClymont:  So we're moving into the Q&A session really imminently.  Is there 
anything any of the panel would like to add that we haven't covered before we go into the 
Q&A session?  Or shall we tackle these issues in the Q&A session?  Is the panel happy 
with that?   
Adam Ridley:  I'd like to make one or two slightly general observations if I may, but 
Marshall, do you want to say something?   
Marshall Field:  No, you carry on. 
Adam Ridley:  I think one has to think quite seriously about the philosophy in which one 
looks back historically at this set of issues, and there are various aspects of the summary 
papers, the excellent summary papers which Hugh has provided, which provoke me.  It's 
interesting that this is called 'The Thatcher Pension Reforms'.  It wasn't the Thatcher 
pension reforms.  It's interesting that much else that was done by the government 
between 1979 and 1990 or whenever she left was constantly being characterised as the 
Thatcher programme.  It's also interesting that things that happened in the 1990s, many of 
my friends blame Mrs T for the denationalisation of the railways.  I point out this 
happened under a different Prime Minister several years after she'd gone.  It's not a 
facetious point.  I think people want all the time to interpret things as being Thatcher, 
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Thatcher, Thatcher alone.  Second point, they want to have a single driving cause.  Now, 
what I've tried to say very briefly in my comments is that there were many, many different 
strands of thought with slightly different emphases, and there was a much more complex 
collective debate going on, and actually, the work that Nick was involved in with Fowler and 
others, and the rest of us, was an exemplary case for joined up government.  Now, the 
third thing is how much was there anything involving what one might call a neoliberal 
agenda?  Well, there was a bit, but I don't really know what the neoliberals were then, or 
who they were.  What is abundantly clear is that the agenda that drove us all in our 
various ways were fairly classic issues.  What was different was the ministers had the 
courage to put them down on paper and look 50 years ahead rather than five months 
ahead, and then to have a systematic approach, and I think that is a very important thing.  
I think one of the things one should look at is the role of the machinery of government 
when it does things well, and I thought it did then.   
Gregg McClymont:  Thank you.  A very appropriate note on which to hand over to the 
floor for questions.  If you can, as I said at the outset, please state who you are really 
clearly, and be aware that you're going to be recorded for posterity.  The gentleman in the 
third row, the gentleman in the first row, the gentleman in the first row, and then the 
gentleman at the back, and the second back row.  So I'll give you six questions to begin.  
Can you take the microphone, sir, sorry.   
Bryn Davies: My name is Bryn Davis.  I'm a consulting actuary, but most relevant for these 
purposes I'm acting more as a witness than a questioner, because at the beginning of this 
period I was the pensions officer of the TUC, and for most of the rest of the period, I 
advised Michael Meacher who for much of the time was the front bench Labour spokesman 
on pensions.  So I am saying something from those angles.  Firstly, I think the role of 
Stewart Lyon is crucially important here.  I guess Marshall knew Stewart better than I did, 
but I did know him, and I spoke to him about the process of the inquiry.  It must have been 
the summer of '86 when he spoke to me, and he's a very, sort of, urbane, not a 
demonstrative man, but he did not regard the process as a success.  He felt that that the 
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experts, we may characterise them, rather than the ideologues on the inquiry had been 
ignored.  The second point I want to make is I don't think treatment of early leavers had 
anything to do with this process.  It was mentioned early on, but that just doesn't make 
sense because the Occupational Pensions Board, of which I was a member, reported on the 
issue in '81, unanimously in effect, and the legislation, was it the '83 Act?  It came into 
effect in '85, I think have got the years slightly wrong, but by the time of the inquiry the 
treatment of early leavers was a settled issue.  There were plenty of other issues, but early 
leavers was not the issue.  Thirdly, it's interesting to note, interesting in the great scope of 
things, not all that important, but interesting to note that the Labour party went into the 
'92 election committed to the restoration of SERPS and placing requirements on personal 
pensions, which honestly they would be unable to deliver.  Of course, lots of people 
expected the Labour Party to win in '92, and it's interesting to speculate quite what would 
have happened to all these reforms if the Labour Party had won on that occasion.   
Gregg McClymont:  Thank you very much, very useful for the record.  Could I take the 
gentleman in the front row?   
Martin White: Thank you.  The name's Martin White.  I'm in actuary who escaped 
pensions in 1988.  To what extent did the whole set of plans consider what the ultimate 
outcomes of personal pensions would be for individuals in terms of their ultimate living 
standards?  Taking into account all the charges which we now appreciate they will have 
suffered.   
Gregg McClymont:  A very good question.  I think we'll take three questions at a time. 
Can we go right to the back, to David at the back.   
David Robbins:  Hi, there.  I'm David Robbins from Willis Towers Watson.  I was just 
struck by the description of the 1985 green paper, how similar that proposal was - to get rid 
of SERPS, just to have a single basic state pension, and then have a fairly low level of 
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compulsory defined contribution, private provision on top of it - to what we ended up with 
30 years later.  You've got a single tier state pension which is fairly similar as a proportion 
of average earnings to what the basic state pension was then, and you've got automatic 
enrolment into predominantly DC pensions at a fairly low contribution rate.  I suppose 
you've also got …, you talked about the ideological elements of the work going on at the 
time, I wonder whether part of the Conservative government's reaction to how badly they 
did amongst young voters at the 2017 election, they're talking about people won't support 
capitalism if they don't have capital.  I thought it was interesting the autumn budget did 
not delay, as previous budgets have done, the forthcoming rise in automatic enrolment 
minimum contributions, so perhaps that sort of thinking of trying to give people their own 
pot of capital is alive, may soon be alive and well today.   
Gregg McClymont:  Thanks, David.  We'll try and get as much of that as we can.  Can I 
just get a third question, and we'll take them together.  I think we had Henry at the back, 
and then we'll come to [inaudible] after the next round.   
Henry Tapper: Hi, Henry Tapper, First Actuarial.  I was one of Thatcher's children.  I 
worked for Mark Weinberg.  I was at Hambro Life in '83/'84, and I stacked up those 
application forms outside of the Newcastle DSS in 1987, and my question is this.  Did you 
in your consideration take into account that there were tens of thousands of young bucks 
like me trying to make an honest living selling financial advice, or more likely personal 
pensions, and that we actually believed in what we were doing because we were almost 
evangelically market driven.  We thought the market could do anything, so Mr White's 
comments were really good, you know, the charges were there but we just didn't think they 
were important, and now, all of these things which we felt we could do, we felt we were 
completely and utterly untouchable, yes?  Regulation, forget it.  We were doing some 
kind of capitalist God's will, and I can honestly say from my situation now, I understand how 
a lot of young IFAs, you know, are setting out in the same direction, so I don't feel so totally 
opposed to what's happening today, because I was there 30 years ago.   
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Gregg McClymont:  Henry, I thought you were going to say you were just in it for the 
money back then.   
 
Henry Tapper:  Yes, I was.  That as well.  You could make £50,000 a year pretty easily.   
 
Gregg McClymont:  Yes, exactly.  I think these questions start to bring out some of the 
issues in my mind.  The first question I would describe as how far did policy makers at this 
stage consider the frictional costs of the private pensions market, which we would now 
consider in lots of context to be pretty significant, given the information asymmetries that 
exist between the individual and the provider.  Secondly, I took, David, not all of your 
points, but the one I took I thought was very important : have we essentially ended up now 
with the flat rate state pension described as a foundation amount in a place where the 
government wanted to get to in this period - which was a state pension, which kept one out 
of abject poverty, and then you have to put on top your own provision, either occupational 
or personal ?  And, well, I don't know how to put Henry's question.  I'll put my own gloss 
on it, which I think relates to the first question.  I mean, just looking at having Mr 
Weinberg on [the inquiry] as the advisor, someone who's company was going to be doing 
this sort of activity and presumably making a lot of money out of it, was that ever 
considered at the time that that sort of individual might be parti pris?  That you needed a 
more objective view of the personal pensions market as it would develop rather than 
having a salesman who was likely to benefit from it being very important in the policy 
making?   
 
Nick Montagu:  I'll pick up that last one, Gregg.  The answer is yes, it was considered, and 
Norman and Mark talked a good deal about this, and Mark very much distanced himself 
from what one might call the actual marketing side.  It was extraordinarily useful having 
him on the inquiry because he did have what one might call the direct commercial selling 
experience, and it's also interesting for the personal dynamics and the influence.  The 
point that was made about Stewart Lyon feeling miffed about the inquiry and feeling 
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ignored, I knew that Stewart, who's as you all know a deeply honourable man, felt very 
strongly that the, if you like, the pure actuarial arguments weren't being adequately 
considered.  I don't think that's quite fair, not least because we did have Edward and 
behind him Chris, very much available to assess the actuarial arguments to give 
dispassionate advice, but I think, and again, this is going perhaps to sound a bit unkind, that 
Norman felt that the advice that he was getting from Stewart and from elsewhere in the 
profession was purist at the expense of politics.  Obviously, it was very important to get 
the best understanding that we could within the parameters of the government's 
imperatives and aspirations of what the actuarial facts of life were.  That ties up with 
questions about was consideration given to what life was going to be like for somebody 
taking out a personal pension, and the answer to that is very much yes.  I hark back to the 
point I touched on earlier about supplementary pension.  Obviously we took advice on 
what was the minimum contribution that at that time on reasonable assumptions seemed 
likely to provide an adequate retirement income.  But I do think that a certain amount of 
the advice that Norman got was too pure.  It wasn't, 'Given that this is what your'e 
wanting to do, one way to do it might be …,' it was more blinkered, it was more purist, and 
I'm afraid against that background it was inevitable that people like Stewart would end up 
cutting less ice than people like Mark, who became very influential in the development of 
the green paper proposals.   
Gregg McClymont:  Thank you.  Can I take on to the, if the panel advocate, we've got a 
lot more questions, so I want to ask … the second question with the third, which I think 
could be collapsed.  I mean, I think we've a Conservative led government after 2010 that 
introduced a charge cap on institutional defined contribution pensions, in recognition of 
how difficult it was for individuals to gain value for money in that institutional space, and 
we had a move into more retail pensions after '86.  Was there a feeling that basically in 
the same way that wealthy people had a stockbroker, who did the share dealing for them, 
that individuals en masse would operate on that basis?  Because that's kind of what it 
feels like looking at it from the outside.  How much understanding was there of all the 
frictional costs that tend to accrue in the investment and pensions space?  That markets, I 
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think it might be widely shared, markets worked very well in lots of areas, but in pensions 
not necessarily so well.  Was there any sense of that?  Chris?   
Chris Deakin:  I'm not sure that I know the answer, but I think it was new territory, so we 
didn't really know exactly how it could work in practice and the regulation of this type of 
selling was in the hands I think at the time of the Securities Investment Board and LAUTRO 
[Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Authority] before the FSA [Financial Services 
Authority] was invented, but we thought we had enough, sort of, margin.  Because of this 
going for the, what's always called, ‘the bribe’, but it wasn't just the 2% addition, it was the 
fact that it was a flat rate rebate, which applied to everybody regardless of age or gender, 
which meant that for the younger population to whom it was believed that the personal 
pensions would be sold, there was a pretty big margin of flexibility to be able to say that 
you can get a good value personal pension with that money, even if the charges were 
significant, and the charges were significant on personal pensions.  We certainly had to 
estimate them, and became more critical when we were doing the contracting out rebate 
for DC pensions later when we didn't have the 2% bribe, because it became part of the 
assumptions for the contracting out rebate.   
Gregg McClymont:  Any views on the content of the two questions? 
Marshall Field:  We did press, on the bribe and all that, we did press on the inquiry for the 
contracting out rebate to be age related, and said there would be a major problem if you 
didn't.  Well, they didn't, and there were.   
Gregg McClymont:  Which maybe speaks to the point made about the view of one of the 
members of the inquiry, retrospectively thinking about it.  Can I take more questions 
please?  Adam, sorry.   
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Adam Ridley:  Can I answer three or four points from what came out first? 
Gregg McClymont:  Yes, you can. 
Adam Ridley:  Or do you want me to wait for the rest, because I shall then have seven or 
eight comments to make, not three or four.   
Gregg McClymont:  Yes, and then you can make some.  Thank you, Adam, that's very 
helpful.  Front row, second row, front row.   
Michael Klimes:  Thanks a lot.  I'm Michael Klimes from Professional Pensions.  I'm a 
journalist, I'm going to go to Money Marketing soon.  I just have a sense of déjà vu, and 
I'm a little bit confused, and I was wondering if anyone on the panel could clear up the fog 
for me, because everything that you're describing is, sort of, what I've been writing about 
for the last three and a bit years.  So in the 1970s there's a lot of tinkering, and then I think 
it was you, Mr Ridley, who said that one of the things about the Fowler Inquiry was that we 
wanted to have some type of, you know, consensus or some type of long-term thinking, not 
just constant tinkering.  Then, despite the warnings of the inquiry, and the scepticism of 
the industry as Marshall Field pointed out, the government goes ahead and does it anyway. 
Adam Ridley:  Does what anyway? 
Michael Klimes:  Sorry? 
Adam Ridley:  Does what? 
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Michael Klimes:  The, well, the personal, sort of, pensions, and then Mr Montagu, you said 
with the 1986 Financial Services Act that the belief was that it would protect people, but 
then later on retrospectively it doesn't, and then we then had the Turner people say we 
need-,  
Gregg McClymont:  I'm going to need to speed you up, sorry, we're going to run out of 
time.   
Michael Klimes:  Where are we going with pensions, because we seem to be stuck on a bit 
of a merry go round.   
Gregg McClymont:  Thank you.  I might leave that until last with the time, because we're 
trying to stick to '86.  I mean, I take your point very well, history repeats itself first as 
tragedy, then as farce.  The gentleman in the front row.   
Roy Colbran: Thank you, my name is Roy Colbran.  I noticed that Hugh and Chris both used 
the word consensus.  I always think that's a bit strong, that the Conservatives really, sort 
of, gave up and said, 'Well, there's got to be a scheme, we'll have to live with this one,' but 
consensus is really a gross exaggeration.  Also I noticed that Chris claims that SERPS was 
designed by GAD, a dubious honour to claim, I would suggest, but it always struck me that 
what they really did was to get Crossman out of the drawer when the government changed, 
and decide that they could just put some new clothes on it, and present it as something 
totally fresh.  Of course, it's interesting to speculate what would have happened 30 years 
on if Keith Joseph's [1973] scheme had come to fruition.  Is NEST [the National 
Employment Savings Trust] a latter day version of Keith Joseph, may I ask?  Now, I was 
part of the small team that represented the actuarial profession in front of the inquiry, and 
looking back at our evidence, one or two things emerge.  In particular, post-retirement 
mortality was clearly not an issue when we were talking about projections of personal 
pensions and their uncertainty, mortality didn't come into it.  When we were talking about 
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the age at which state pension age might be equalised, we didn't talk about improvements, 
but Professor Bernard Benjamin did say, 'There is likely to be some increase in the ratio of 
persons of pensionable age to the available working population between 1981 and 2021.' 
So perhaps Chris can tell us when post-retirement mortality really took off?  But we were 
saying that we still thought that defined benefits were a growing trend, although we did say 
that the complexities that then were close to the limit, and we certainly, Nick, we did warn 
about mis-selling and the difficulty of obtaining independent advice.  Thank you.   
Gregg McClymont:  Thank you, sir.  Third question quickly from the gentleman in the 
second row.  As brief as possible, please.   
Roy Brimblecombe: My name is Roy Brimblecombe.  I was deputy chairman of the Life 
Insurance Council of the ABI, which was the successor of the LOA [Life Offices’ Association], 
and then became chairman two years later.  I was heavily involved in giving evidence on 
behalf of the ABI to the Fowler Inquiry.  There were just two points I wanted to make.  I 
agree with Bryn behind that the question of revaluation of early benefit had all died down 
by then, and wasn't an issue.  I think people are a bit hard on members of the committee, 
particularly Stewart Lyon, because I've known him for donkey's years.  It may be that, you 
know, on that panel, you needed some sort of practical thesis as well as the pure actuarial 
thesis, but the other point I wanted to make, I know Marshall said you weren't allowed to 
talk about tax, but it's ironical that the Treasury were so worried about the tax reliefs for 
occupational pensions that the budget of 1986 brought in a cap of the total amount of 
surplus that an occupational scheme could have, and it had to reduce its contributions to 
take that basis [inaudible].  So from that point of view, it's not relevant to this, but it does 
seem to imply that the Treasury were worried about the cost of the tax relief on 
occupational schemes at the same time.   
Gregg McClymont:  Thank you, so we've got tax issue, always important to the Treasury, 
longevity projections, how far they were part of the thinking.  Then the warnings about 
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potential mis-selling.  You know, how seriously were they taken?  Adam, do you want to 
do that, and make the broader observations you wanted to make?   
Adam Ridley:  Well, if I can just pick up where we began.  The ‘experts ignored Lyons' 
complaint.  I think that people who provide expert input into a large number of processes 
and debates tends to get too depressed if they're not followed lock, stock, and barrel, and I 
think that probably, I have no knowledge about what happened, I think probably Mr Lyons 
had much more influence than he reckoned at the time, or reckons today.  The intellectual 
point about early leavers being largely dealt with, the problem of early leavers by the '81 
and '83 Act, and recommendations from the OPB [Occupational Pensions Board], yes, it's 
fascinating how the benefit of that fuss continued to mobilise and stimulate people, even 
though they hadn't really asked themselves whether there was still an objective need for 
doing anything about it.  So I think it was a very good influence, because I felt that we 
could go further and farther on that.  Restoration of SERPS in the Labour manifesto of 
1992, I will merely say it would have been as mad then as it was earlier, and I can recall 
when I was building socialism in the Department of Economic Affairs in 1968 with the 
economists and the actuaries saying, 'For Heaven's sake, we've got a completely mad plan 
to introduce a state based, earnings related supplementary pension system.  We must not 
put it in any of our models.' They were already desperately worried about it, so that's my 
comment on that.   
Gregg McClymont:  Was there any, either at that time or later on, I was going to ask this 
of Chris, actually, based off of the actuarial projections, of what was going on 
internationally?  Because of course, depending on where you placed Britain in the 
spectrum of left to right, other countries had much larger, and dealt with much larger state 
based systems, so when the government actuaries gave the projections, does it pay any 
attention to what's going on in the rest of the world?   
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Chris Deakin:  Well, it probably does much more now than it did then, because, I mean, I 
think the UK was ahead of the game in the extent to which we had actuarial projections if 
government pension systems.  A lot of other European countries were doing very short-
term projections and not looking at the long-term consequences.  The US was different. 
The US did have an equivalent of the Government Actuary who did long-term projections 
But we were aware of changes taking place worldwide.  We were aware of the Chile 
experiment.  Everybody in the Social Security world thought that this was a crazy idea and 
would never work.   
Gregg McClymont:  And they were right, more or less. 
Chris Deakin:  Yes, but I think coming back to the mortality issue, we always made some 
projection of mortality improvement, going way back, but not nearly enough probably, and 
then over the years, the actual experience proved to be much more favourable to the old 
people, unfavourable to the pension system, because people lived longer, until the last few 
years.  I mean, since the 2008 population projections the estimates of expectation of life 
at 65 have been falling in the national population projection.  So there's been a bit of a 
reversal there.   
Gregg McClymont:  Was there any awareness of the Chilean crisis as intimated, or was of 
the Chilean approach?  I ask that in particular because, you know, I've got a bee in my 
bonnet about the absence of pension fund representation on the '83 inquiry, and the 
central thing about the Chilean approach is that the employers got involved.  The 
employer makes no contribution.  Was that in the Conservative circles or in the inquiry's 
proceedings?  Do you remember references to the Chileans?   
Nick Montagu:  No, I don't.  As I say, we did a number of overseas visits with Norman. 
He was I mentioned very struck by America.  He looked at a number of things.  I 
remember a hilarious visit to the Netherlands, which wasn't influential.  Switzerland of 
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course had pioneered a universal mandatory occupational scheme, albeit on a rather 
different scale.  At one point, and Marshall will remember this, he was very interested in 
the possibility of industry-wide schemes, and there was a visit to France to look at the 
arrangements there, but again, this didn't command any huge support, and didn't emerge 
in any of the final deliberations.   
Marshall Field:  Yes, that's right.  We were ahead, then.  Now I'm told we look abroad 
all the time for pensions advice, but things were different.   
Gregg McClymont:  Yes, yes, that's probably fair to say. 
Nick Montagu:  If I can just make the point, Gregg, it’s no part of my job to vindicate or 
not to vindicate what the inquiry did, but in one way I think you can see Norman as having 
being ahead of his time.  And it's in this way.  I just want, if I may, and I realise we're up 
against the time, to go back to that American experience.  He was hugely influenced by 
our going there right up against the time limit for tax filing, and for the way that IRAs, 
Individual Retirement Accounts, were advertised in virtually every window, and were in 
everybody's consciousness.  But also one of the things that surprised me, and my 
subsequent life hasn't been a pensions life mainly, has been how long it took for the flight 
from defined benefit schemes that one saw in the United States in the wake of ERISA, the 
Employment Retirement Income Securities Act, which was already a fact of life when we 
went to the States in 1984, to come here.  In one way, you can see what Norman was 
seeking to achieve from the inquiry as being ahead of its time in anticipating that.   
Gregg McClymont:  I think that's fascinating on a couple of levels.  The first is the way in 
which policy can be influenced by impressions and anecdotal experience, because we know 
about the US system, that half of all employees have no pension provision whatsoever.  
Secondly, I think in terms of that, the linkages through history, it's said, although I don't 
know whether it's true or not, that the Chancellor who brought in pensions freedoms [in 
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2014] was extremely influenced by what he saw to be the success of [US] 401(k)s.  Again, 
some people would argue against at least some of the evidence and that very, very 
different approach to the European style approach, which is based on sector-wide schemes, 
of course.  I think that's really interesting in bringing things together.  Of course, 
politicians from all persuasions are influenced by these impressions and experiences.  
Tony Crosland was very influenced by his time in America for sure.  I'm using the chair's 
prerogative.  A couple of the final statements and questions from the floor were excellent, 
but I think relate more to what will happen in the next seminar, which is looking back at the 
success or failure of the '86 Act, and I think they will be logged for the record and then we 
can come back and look in detail at the successes and failures of the Act.  I want to finish 
by asking the panel if there's anything they want to say briefly in summing up.  You don't 
have to if you feel that all the points have been covered that you wished to make, but 
please if you do, any final comments?   
Adam Ridley:  Just one on the issue of how much research was done on the individual 
impact of various aspects of the proposals under consideration, and indeed of the impacts 
on the industry, the energetic salesman, and all the rest of it.  The Treasury had a good 
modelling process for the impact on the individual of a variety of Social Security and tax 
changes.  If they weren't using that, then I'm a Dutchman.  I'm sure they were, and I 
don't know whether the DHSS were sharing the information with the Treasury or had their 
own system, but it would be very odd if they weren't.  Now, what was then done with it 
when it went up from the official and the statistical level to the various bodies is another 
matter, but the capacity is there, and the motivation is there, and I may say a great deal of 
external pressure nowadays from the BBC and the newspapers as they prepare their 
supplements.  The only other comment I would make is this business about consensus.  I 
go back to what I said, I don't feel in any way that it's reasonable to think that the exercise 
that Lord Fowler launched didn't end up by reflecting any consensus or help shape one.  
One of the great things is to try and get somewhere and what that exercise represented 
was an ex ante desire to try and create a consensus.  Now, it may have failed, and it may 
be that politics took over, and we could have said more about that, but I think people 
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underestimate the importance of the effort that went on, and the revolution that it 
involved internally within government.   
Gregg McClymont:  Thank you very much.  Are we content? 
Chris Deakin:  Could I just make one comment in relation to Roy's mention of the Finance 
Act, 1986, which was of course at the same time as all this was happening, but that was the 
Treasury and that was tax, but that move to tax surplus in pensions schemes was driven by 
a belief in the Treasury that the occupational pension schemes were just stashing away 
money free of tax, and therefore they had to clamp down on that by imposing this limit on 
funding.  Which led to all the contribution holidays, which led to a whole sequence of 
other things, which is one of the major factors in why the occupational pension scheme 
system has disintegrated.  So possibly that decision in the Finance Act was much more 
influential in terms of the future of pensions in the UK than all of the stuff we talked about 
in the Social Security Act.   
Gregg McClymont:  Thank you, Chris.  I think a wonderful point to finish on, and reflect 
on.  Even the Treasury isn't fallible, or perhaps especially the Treasury.  Can I just take 
this opportunity to ask you please to fill out your feedback forms if you are so desiring, and 
also the project at the University of Bristol, led by Professor Pemberton, would be delighted 
to have your thoughts in writing about the issues we've discussed tonight.  Beyond that, 
it's just left to me to thank with real gratitude what I think have been outstanding panellists. 
Thank you very much for your time this evening, your reflections and your thoughtfulness.  
Thank you very much.   
END 
University of Bristol, Department of History
9 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TB, United Kingdom. 
Tel +44 (0)117 928 7621 Email h.pemberton@bristol.ac.uk
bristol.ac.uk
UoB_indesign-reportcover Folder2.indt   9 05/11/2018   11:07
